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way in the contract was "non-exclusive"; and (2) the Land Board had
The court
the discretion to relocate Rangeview's rights-of-way.
the
court
contended
that an
with
both
arguments.
First,
disagreed
owner of property where another has rights-of-way may not interfere in
an unreasonable manner with those rights, and allowing Aurora access
to the disputed sites would unreasonably infringe on Rangeview's
rights. Second, the court noted that according to the terms of the lease
agreement, the Land Board could only relocate Rangeview's rights-ofway when it was convenient for both parties, not for the benefit of a
third party. Further, relocating rights-of-way was only permissible for
the "commercially reasonable development of the Lowry Range."
Aurora next argued that, in spite of the Land Board's rejection of
their request, the City could still potentially gain access to the disputed
sites through negotiation with Rangeview, and thus a summary
judgment based on the "can and will" requirement was not appropriate.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the fact that the parties
were opponents in this action was sufficient evidence that compromise
was not a substantial possibility.
Finally, Aurora contended that a less rigid "can and will" rule should
be applied in this case because speculation was not an issue. The court
responded by clarifying that this rule actually requires a technical
obstacle to the "can and will" requirement and that such a requirement
impedes maximum utilization. The court pointed out that neither of
these criteria was satisfied, and so the relaxed standard did not apply.
Similarly, the court noted that section 37-87-101 (1) (b) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, which requires state agencies to allow persons to
acquire real property for water storage "to the maximum extent
practicable," does not apply in this situation as it would not be
"practicable" for the Land Board to acquiesce to Aurora's request for
access to the disputed sites.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's ruling, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the decision.
JamesHenderson

N. Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Simpson, 202 P.3d 1207 (Colo. 2009)
(holding that a fixed water year does not itself impose a limit on
decreed storage rights, but is merely the administrative mechanism by
which the one-fill rule lawfully limits those rights).
The North Sterling Irrigation District ("NSID") requested water
under its storage rights; however, the State and Division Engineers for
Water Division No. 1 (the "Engineers") denied the requests. The
Engineers stated that the November 1 water year and the one-fill rule
limited NSID's diversions. NSID filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment requesting that the water court determine whether Colorado
law authorizes the Engineers to impose a fixed water year on NSID for
purposes of administering the one-fill rule. The City of Boulder,
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Centennial Water and Sanitation District, and Pawnee Well Users
intervened as Intervenors-Plaintiffs ("Intervenors"). The water court
held that the Engineers had the authority to impose a fixed water year
to administer the one-fill rule. NSID appealed, and the Colorado
Supreme Court conducted de novo review of the water court's
determination of Colorado law.
The Engineers maintained that, the November 1 water year had
been in place since 1936, and no change in administrative policy had
occurred. NSID asserted that, since 1911, the operable policy was the
low-point administration regime and diversion based on a variable
calendar year. Intervenors argued that a change in administration of
NSID's water rights would change the timing of NSID's requests and
inhibit Intervenors' diversions.
The court considered the Engineers' authority pursuant to
Colorado statute and explained that it is the Engineers' duty to
administer the waters of the state and that this duty includes curtailing
diversions that contravene applicable law.
Relying on previous
Colorado Supreme Court decisions, the court explained that the onefill limitation on water storage rights dictates that the Engineers limits a
reservoir to one annual filling, up to its decreed capacity. Upon
reaching capacity, the Engineers can refuse to honor a call during the
remainder of that one-year period. Further, if the storage decree is
silent regarding administration of the one-fill rule, then the Engineers
have authority to account for and, if necessary, curtail diversions that
violate the rule.
According to Colorado case law, the November 1 date represents
the generally accepted start-date for the administrative water year. In
addition, the court recognized that a variable year can provide
inadequate protection to the rights of junior water users. Finally,
parties claiming historical water uses must obtain' a judicial
determination adjudicating those rights so that the party has standing
to enforce its historical use.
The court concluded that NSID had not demonstrated any legal
injury associated with a change in administrative policy because 1) NSID
had not adjudicated its rights; 2) NSID's historical diversions were
consistent with a fixed water year; 3) a former NSID manager wrote a
letter in 1989, objecting to the November 1 policy; 4) NSID's decree
was silent regarding administration of the one-fill rule; and 5) NSID
could have diverted water in-priority any day of the year, as long as the
right had not exceeded the volumetric limitation of the one-fill rule.
Any limitation on NSID's storage rights was imposed by Colorado's onefill rule, not the Engineers' fixed water year. Finally, low-point
administration had the potential to unlawfully enlarge NSID's water
rights and harm to junior users.
Based on the foregoing, the court found that a fixed water year does
not itself impose a limit on NSID's decreed storage rights, but is merely
the administrative mechanism by which the one-fill rule lawfully limits
those rights. The court determined that because there was no change
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in administrative policy, the fixed water year did not affect Intervenors'
rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the water court's holdings.
Marie! Yarbrough
Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d 774
(Colo. 2009) (holding that the water districts did not display a
substantial probability that they. Would utilize the requested
appropriations, and that the evidence supported a fifty-year water
supply planning period, but did not support conditional water
appropriations for recreational in-channel rights or possible bypass flow
requirements of federal permits, or a fifty cubic feet per second
diversion from a pumping station for use in the water districts' system).
The Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District and the San Juan
Water Conservancy District ("Districts") made an initial application for
the right to store 29,000 acre-feet of water in Dry Gulch Reservoir with
the right to refill the reservoir and potentially use up to 64,000 acre-feet
of water per year, a 100 cubic feet per second ("cfs") direct flow right at
the Dry Gulch Pumping Station into storage, and a eighty cfs direct flow
right from the pumping station for use anywhere in the districts system.
The Districts based their initial application on a 100-year planning
period and the District -Court, Water Division 7 approved the initial
decree. Trout Unlimited appealed the decree and the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision determining that
the Districts had not provided enough evidence to support a 100-year
planning period. On remand the water court issued a decree with a
fifty year planning period, and Trout Unlimited appealed to the court
again, bringing this action.
On appeal, Trout Unlimited asserted that the Districts had not
provided enough information to substantiate the allocation requests
made, even under the shorter planning period. The Districts' revised
decree consisted of a conditional storage right of 19,000 acre-feet with
the right to refill to a total annual storage of 25,300 acre-feet in Dry
Gulch Reservoir, a direct diversion of 100 cfs from the San Juan River
into storage at Dry Gulch, and a separate direct diversion flow right of
fifty cfs from the San Juan River for use anywhere in the Districts'
system. The Districts attempted to use a planning period of seventy
years, but the water court approved a period of fifty years. Trout
Unlimited appealed this decision as well, asserting that the court's
remand instructions lent to a thirty-five-year planning period, ending in
2040.
Reviewing the new appeal, the court determined that the fifty-year
planning period decided on by the water court was appropriate and
comported with statutory requirements and other decisions by the
court. Due to the lengthy lead-time necessary to prepare the Dry Gulch
Reservoir, it would not be ready for use until 2025. The fifty-year
planning period, which reaches to 2055, also coincides with other state
initiatives to project Colorado population and geographic location for

